CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1603
18 January 2000

Original: ENGLISH

Agenda for the 2000 session

(Adopted at the 837th plenary meeting, on 18 January 2000)

Taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of its agenda, and without prejudice to their outcome, the Conference adopts the following agenda for its 2000 session:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

7. Transparency in armaments.

8 Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1604
24 January 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE ENGLISH SUMMARY OF A GOVERNMENT REPORT ON EXPORTS OF DEFENCE MATERIEL FROM NORWAY IN 1998

I have the honour to transmit to you the English summary of a Government Report on Exports of Defence materiel from Norway in 1998.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for distribution of its English version as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament to all members and participating non-member state delegations.

(Signed) Bjørn Skogmo
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1605
27 January 2000

ENGLISH
Original: ARABIC, CHINESE, ENGLISH, FRENCH, RUSSIAN AND SPANISH

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A JOINT STATEMENT[1] MADE BY PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN AND PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN ON 10 DECEMBER 1999

On 9 and 10 December 1999, the President of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Jiang Zemin and the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, held a second informal summit during which they had an in-depth exchange of views on issues of common interest. The two leaders issued a joint statement on 10 December 1999. Please find attached the text of the aforementioned joint statement in the Chinese and Russian languages.

We would be grateful if the joint statement could be issued and ciruclated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) HU Xiaodi
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative
Head of delegation of the
People's Republic of China to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed) Vasily SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

[1] Previously issued as document A/54/681-S/1999/1264 dated 20 December 1999.

Annex

Joint Chinese-Russian statement adopted on 10 December 1999

In the course of their second informal meeting, held in Beijing on 9 and 10 December 1999, Mr. Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China, and Mr. B. N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, held an in-depth exchange of views on questions of mutual interest. Afterwards, the two heads of State adopted the following statement:

I

The two heads of State emphasize the importance and timeliness of the conclusions and assessments contained in the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order of 23 April 1997, the joint Russian-Chinese statement of 10 November 1997, the joint statement on the results of the Russian-Chinese summit meeting on Russian-Chinese relations on the threshold of the twenty-first century, and the joint communiqué on the results of the Russian-Chinese summit meeting of 23 November 1998.

The leaders of China and the Russian Federation reaffirm that they will strictly adhere to the principled approaches to international questions set forth in the above-mentioned documents. They advocate the establishment in the twenty-first century of a multipolar world based on the Charter of the United Nations and the applicable norms of international law, the strengthening of the leading role of the United Nations in international affairs, the peaceful settlement of international disputes by political means, equitable relations among all members of the international community and equal security for all, respect for each other's choice of the path of development and each other's sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the creation of a just, equitable and mutually advantageous international political and economic order. The two sides appeal to all countries of the world to make concerted efforts for the creation of a democratic and balanced multipolar world structure in which the different cultures would exist harmoniously, cooperate constructively and enrich each other, and in which the equality of all sovereign States would be ensured.

II

The two sides feel obliged to note the recent growth of unfavourable trends in the sphere of international security.

The two sides consider that the creation, in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, of a national anti-ballistic-missile defence system by one of the States which signed that Treaty will have a destructive effect on strategic stability and on the entire structure of key international agreements relating to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, and will mar prospects for achieving further progress in these directions.

The two sides reaffirm that they consider unacceptable any attempts to violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and emphasize that the Treaty has been and must remain a cornerstone of strategic stability. The two sides hold the view that the 1972 Treaty must be strictly and fully implemented. In this connection, the sides note in particular the importance of General Assembly resolution 54/54 A, of 1 December 1999, entitled "Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems", submitted by China, the Russian Federation and Belarus.

The two sides point out that the plans of certain Governments to develop a regional anti-ballistic-missile defence system are liable to undermine peace and stability in the Asia and Pacific region. The Russian side supports the position of the Chinese side to the effect that the inclusion of the Chinese province of Taiwan in these plans in any form by any Government whatsoever is unacceptable.

The two sides express deep regret over the refusal by the United States of America to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The two countries stress that they share identical or similar positions on a number of key issues, and this is a major prerequisite for joint or coordinated efforts to maintain strategic stability. These key issues include the prevention of an arms race in outer space or through the use of information technology, implementation of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the elaboration of a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention and the drafting of an agenda for the Conference on Disarmament.

The Chinese side expresses its understanding of the position of the Russian side with regard to the further reduction of the strategic offensive weapons of the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

The two sides consider that full responsibility for the consequences of any undermining of strategic stability and international security would rest with those States which caused the collapse of fundamental agreements in the field of disarmament. The sides maintain that, in the present situation, there is a growing need for close coordination of actions in the maintenance of global strategic stability.

III

The two sides observe that certain adverse trends are increasingly discernible in international relations. These include the endeavour to foist on the international community a unipolar global structure and a single system of culture, values and ideology; attempts to weaken the role of the United Nations and its Security Council; the search for grounds to justify the irresponsible interpretation or revision of the fundamental contents and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; the strengthening and expansion of military blocs; the replacement of international law by pressure tactics and even the resort to military force; the use of the concept which holds that "human rights take precedence over sovereignty" and of the theories of "humanitarian intervention" to infringe the sovereign rights of independent States.

The two sides express their readiness, together with other countries, to oppose such trends, which prevent the establishment of an equitable, multipolar structure of international relations.

IV

The two sides emphasize that a major priority of the foreign-policy efforts of China and the Russian Federation is the affirmation of the leading role of the United Nations in world affairs.

The two sides agree that the rational and carefully administered reform of the Organization will help to strengthen its authority and role. At the same time, the two sides express the conviction that the status and role of the Security Council, as the principal organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, must under no circumstances be placed in doubt or weakened. The sides once again declare that the retention unchanged of the powers vested under the Charter in the existing permanent members of the Security Council is essential for maintaining the effectiveness and stability of the United Nations.

V

China and the Russian Federation attach great importance to their admission to membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) under conditions that would enable them to occupy an equitable and worthy place in the world-trade system, which would be in keeping with the interests of all members of that Organization. Negotiations on the admission of China and the Russian Federation into the WTO have reached a decisive stage. The two sides consider that the WTO should be universal in character and that, with regard to the conditions for the admission of new members, a balance should be maintained between rights and obligations, with consideration also being given to their level of socio-economic development.

VI

The two sides maintain that international terrorism, religious extremism and national separatism in all its forms, as well as transnational criminal activities (such as illicit trafficking in arms, narcotic drugs and psychotropic and explosive substances, and economic offences) have now become serious threats to the security of sovereign States and to international peace and security.

The two sides reaffirm their determination to take practical, coordinated steps to combat those phenomena on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

VII

China and the Russian Federation express their satisfaction at the pace of implementation of the Bishkek Declaration, adopted by the heads of States members of the "Shanghai Five" (the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan) on 25 August 1999 (A/54/314-S/1999/942, annex).

The meeting of the senior law-enforcement officials of the five States held in Bishkek on 1 and 2 December 1999 was a significant practical step in that direction. The two sides consider that the meeting of ministers of defence of the countries of the "Shanghai Five" to be held in the year 2000 will be an important step towards implementing the agreements reached by the five heads of State.

The two sides consider that the time is now ripe to begin preparations for a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the five States.

The sides support the idea of conducting consultations among experts of the Five on questions of multilateral economic cooperation (including cooperation in the transport field and in the extraction and transport of oil and gas). Such talks could become an important and integral part of preparations for a meeting of the heads of State of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan.

VIII

The two sides underscore the need for the earliest possible resolution of the question of Iraq exclusively through political means in strict accordance with the norms of international law, in keeping with the central role of the Security Council and on the basis of the resolutions it has adopted. The resumption by Iraq of cooperation with the United Nations must be accompanied by the lifting of the economic sanctions imposed on that country.

IX

The two sides expressed serious concern about the development of the situation in and around Kosovo and the escalation of inter-ethnic tension in the region, particularly in connection with the unsatisfactory level of implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the growing trend towards separating Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. China and the Russian Federation, as two permanent members of the Security Council, urge all interested parties to ensure the full and unconditional implementation of all provisions of resolution 1244 (1999), full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the comprehensive and consistent observance of the Charter of the United Nations and of the universally recognized principles of international law, and respect for the legitimate rights of all nationalities in the Kosovo region.

X

The two sides reaffirm their mutual support for the maintenance of each other's national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Russian side, in supporting the important issue of the reunification of China, reaffirmed its position on the question of Taiwan set forth in earlier documents adopted jointly by the two sides, and declared that it could not accept affirmations that relations between the two sides situated on the opposing shores of the Taiwan Strait were "relations between States". The Chinese side expressed satisfaction regarding the above-mentioned position of the Russian side.

The Chinese side again declared that the Chechen problem was entirely an internal affair of the Russian Federation. The Chinese side supports the actions being taken by the Government of the Russian Federation to combat terrorist and separatist forces. The Russian side expressed satisfaction with regard to the above-mentioned position of the Chinese side.

* * *

China and the Russian Federation, in pursuance of their goal of achieving an equitable and trusting strategic partnership, and also on the basis of the convergence or similarity of their positions both on questions of principle relating to the building of a multipolar, democratic and equitable world order and on specific current international problems, will strengthen cooperation in those directions. The cooperation of the two sides in international affairs is not directed against third countries; rather, it is aimed at protecting their own fundamental national interests, but also at strengthening peace and stability in the Asia and Pacific region and throughout the world.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1606
9 February 2000

ENGLISH
Original: CHINESE

LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING A WORKING PAPER ENTITLED "CHINA'S POSITION ON AND SUGGESTIONS FOR WAYS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT"

On instructions from the Chinese Government, I have the honour to attach herewith a working paper entitled "China's position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament".

I would be grateful if this document could be issued and circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Hu Xiaodi
Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs
Head of the Delegation of China to
the Conference on Disarmament

GE.00-60481 (E)

China

Working Paper

CHINA'S POSITION ON AND SUGGESTIONS FOR WAYS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Outer space belongs to all mankind. All countries have equal rights in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes although their levels of economic and scientific development may differ. It is the shared desire of all mankind to forestall the spread of weapons and an arms race in outer space.

Some people believe that since currently there is no arms race in outer space, the CD has no need to discuss its prevention or negotiate the conclusion of international legal instruments in this regard. However, history and reality have both shown not only that there are indeed attempts, programmes and moves unilaterally to seek military and strategic superiority in or control over outer space but that there have been new developments in this respect. Such development, if unchecked, may lead to the weaponization of outer space in the near future or even to a multilateral arms race in outer space. Therefore, it is a present and pressing necessity for the international community to take effective measures to stop such negative developments.

I. OUR VIEWS ON HOW TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF PAROS AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

As the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament (Conference) should concentrate on the most pressing and prominent issues in international arms control and disarmament, the ones that have the greatest bearing on global peace and security in the twenty-first century. PAROS is one such important issue, and should therefore be a top priority at the Conference. The Conference should play a primary role in the negotiations to prevent any form of arms race in outer space.

At its fifty-fourth session the United Nations General Assembly once again adopted, by an overwhelming majority, a resolution on PAROS. It was reaffirmed that negotiating an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remains a priority task of the CD's Ad Hoc Committee. The fact that the resolution was adopted without opposition reflects the common aspiration and insistent demand of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The General Assembly also adopted at its fifty-fourth session, and also by an overwhelming majority, a resolution on preservation of and compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an issue that is related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the resolution the General Assembly recognizes the historical role of the 1972 Treaty as a cornerstone for maintaining global peace and security and strategic stability, reaffirms its continued validity and relevance in the current international situation and supports further efforts

by the international community in the light of emerging developments with the goal of safeguarding the inviolability and integrity of the ABM Treaty in which the international community bears strong interest.

Since PAROS was put on the CD agenda in 1982, the Conference has, through the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee and other means, held discussions on definitions, principles, existing treaties and confidence-building measures, and accumulated experience in this field, preparing the ground for future work in this area. With the accelerated development of outer space weapons, anti-ballistic missiles and other weapon systems, individual countries have stepped up efforts to secure military superiority in outer space and have mapped out and are pursuing plans to secure military superiority on the ground from space. In these circumstances, preventing outer space from becoming a new venue for an arms race without prejudice to its peaceful uses has obviously become the most important and pressing task of the Conference.

To accomplish this, the Conference must first re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 3 to negotiate and conclude an international legal instrument prohibiting the testing, deployment and use of weapons, weapon systems and components in outer space so as to prevent the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space.

In carrying out its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee must take into account all relevant developments and specific proposals, present and future. As a preliminary step towards the negotiation of an international legal instrument, it might discuss and review all pertinent issues, including current military activities in outer space and related developments, their influence on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; shortcomings in the existing international instruments; and the basic elements of the future international legal instrument.

The Chinese delegation has taken note of the various ideas and suggestions on PAROS put forward in the CD. China believes that the re-established Ad Hoc Committee should be an open-ended, all-embracing mechanism where all participants may air and discuss different views. It should set as its ultimate goal and clear mandate the negotiation and conclusion of one or several international legal instruments to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space.

II. OUR VIEWS ON THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING PAROS

A number of international legal instruments on the peaceful uses of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space have been concluded.

The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion in outer space. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion in any circumstances.

According to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of

sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies is forbidden.

The 1972 Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems prohibits the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components.

Besides these, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies all contain provisions on outer space activities which have helped to constrain some aspects of military activities in outer space to some extent.

However, these instruments have been ineffective in preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. Some have imposed limited prohibitions and contained many loopholes and ambiguities. Some have not been fully complied with or are in danger of being violated, amended or even abrogated. Most crucially, as they have failed to reflect the latest developments in aerospace technology they cannot prevent the potential weaponization of outer space or an arms race in outer space in the twenty-first century.

The Chinese delegation believes that the most direct and effective way to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is to negotiate and conclude new international legal instruments while strictly observing the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements.

III. CHINA'S BASIC POSITION ON PAROS

China has always opposed arms races, in outer space and elsewhere. It maintains that the exploration and use of outer space should only serve to promote countries' economic, scientific and cultural development and benefit all mankind.

With the use of military satellites, outer space has already been militarized to some extent. Military satellites involve rather complex issues and their role should not be all together negated. Therefore, the primary goal at present in our efforts to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is to ban the testing, deployment and use of weapons, weapon systems and components in outer space.

What should be particularly emphasized is that the Powers with the greatest space capabilities bear a special responsibility for preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space and ensuring the use of space for peaceful purposes. Pending the conclusion of a new multilateral legal instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, all countries concerned should undertake not to test, deploy or use any weapons, weapon systems or components in outer space.

IV. TENTATIVE IDEAS ON NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

The Chinese delegation tentatively suggests that the new international legal instruments to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, in whatever form or by whatever name, might contain the following basic elements:

(i) Purposes: to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, and to use outer space for peaceful purposes.

(ii) Basic obligations: not to test, deploy or use weapons, weapon systems or components. Consideration could also be given to an article on "permissible activities" thus helping to distinguish between activities that are prohibited and those that are not, and thereby safeguarding States Parties' lawful right to utilize outer space for peaceful purposes.

(iii) An article on definitions, providing clear definitions of the concepts mentioned, e.g. "outer space", "space weapons", "weapon systems" and "components of weapon systems".

(iv) Provision for appropriate national implementation measures and the designation or establishment of organizations to ensure that States Parties implement the instruments consistently and effectively.

(v) An article on international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space promoting international exchanges, technical assistance and cooperation for peaceful purposes so that all countries can share in the economic and technological benefits of scientific advances in outer space, and outer space truly serves all mankind.

(vi) Verification: we must first consider fully how technically feasible it is, and on that basis determine whether to use inspections or alternative means to prevent treaty violations.

(vii) Establishment of an appropriate mechanism for consultations, clarifications and resolution of possible disputes in order to appropriately address such suspicions and disputes as might arise among States Parties.

(viii) Appropriate, rational and workable confidence-building measures to enhance mutual trust among States Parties and forestall unnecessary suspicion about particular activities.

(ix) The procedural articles commonly found in international legal instruments dealing with amendment, length of validity, signature, ratification, entry into force, depository and authentic texts. These may of course also have to resolve some sensitive and key issues.

The Chinese delegation wishes to emphasize that these are only tentative ideas that need to be developed. Our aim in putting them forward is to give all participants food for thought, pool our collective wisdom and encourage a fuller, more detailed examination of the relevant issues at the Conference. We will participate in such discussions and negotiations with an open mind, listening to and accepting good ideas and proposals from all parties and striving unremittingly to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space and to ensure the continued peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of all mankind.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1607
15 March 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 2000 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NORWAY ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE ELEMENTS OF A COMMON UNDERSTANDING FROM THE SECOND OSLO MEETING ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS, HELD IN OSLO, NORWAY, ON 6 AND 7 DECEMBER 1999 1/

I have the honour to transmit to you the Elements of a Common Understanding from The Second Oslo Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in Oslo, Norway, on 6 and 7 December 1999.

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament to all members and participating non-member state delegations.

(Signed) Steffen Kongstad
Minister
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

1/ Previously issued as document A/54/739 dated 7 February 2000 as attached.

United Nations A/54/739

General Assembly

Distr.: General
7 February 2000

Original: English

Fifty-fourth session
Agenda item 76 (f)
General and complete disarmament: small arms

Letter dated 3 February 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the documents of the second Oslo Meeting on Small Arms, held in Oslo on 6 and 7 December 1999 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its enclosures could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 76 (f).

(Signed) Ole Peter Kolby
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-28431 (E) 180200

Annex

The Second Oslo Meeting on Small Arms and Light Weapons (Oslo II), 6-7 December 1999

Elements of a Common Understanding

Concerns and Challenges

Representatives from 18 countries (annex I), recognizing the problems caused by the excessive availability, accumulation and uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons, met in Oslo 6 and 7 December, 1999 as a follow-up to the first Oslo Meeting (13-14 July, 1998) in order to further discuss the humanitarian, developmental, and security concerns raised by this issue.

Most contemporary conflicts have been fought with small arms and light weapons, often targeting civilians, as well as humanitarian operations and UN and other personnel. The accumulations and flows of small arms and light weapons often undermine economic development, impair conflict prevention efforts; exacerbate armed conflicts; complicate peacekeeping and peace support operations; and retard post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction. Trafficking in small arms has become an integral part of vicious circles where conflict feeds on itself, making it difficult to promote durable peace. Representatives recognized that controlling and regulating brokering activities is one element in a comprehensive approach to dealing with problems relating to small arms and light weapons. When considering action and policy on all aspects of the small arms problem, it was recognized that the different security situations of states must be taken into account.

Objectives

An objective of the international small arms agenda, focusing on both illicit and licit activities, is to control and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and use of these weapons. To achieve this objective, a number of interlocking strategies have been developed i. a.:

- Combatting illicit manufacturing and trafficking by developing inter alia international legally binding instruments.
- Strengthening regulation and controls on destabilizing accumulations and transfers.
- Considering measures to deal with the issue of arms brokering.
- Enhancing transparency measures, including information exchange and consultations.
- Setting up and providing assistance to national programs to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in excess of legitimate defence requirements.
- Promoting local, national and regional practical disarmament measures in the context of the consolidation of peace, through the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.
- Further developing norms and standards to promote supplier restraint.

The objectives of the Second Oslo Meeting were twofold:

1. The international agenda on small arms and light weapons:

- To take stock of developments on the international small arms agenda during the past year.
- To deepen the common understanding of the participants of the challenges ahead.
- To exchange information among participants on initiatives/priorities they have taken, or will take, to move the agenda forward in order to optimize the use of available resources and to promote complementarity of efforts.
- And, to discuss how the growing international awareness of the small arms agenda can be translated into practical, result-oriented action.

2. Arms brokering:

- To have a more in-depth review of challenges related to arms brokering in all its aspects and related activities, including a discussion of measures to deal with the issue.

The International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons

Review – The process ahead

- The meeting recognized and welcomed the different initiatives which have moved the international agenda on small arms and light weapons forward. Various global, regional and sub-regional initiatives are reflected in annex II. The urgent need for practical action was reiterated and the expansion of these and further initiatives was encouraged. The meeting recognized the need for continued international support for and assistance to such initiatives.

- It was noted that the participating states are actively involved in many key initiatives in the field of small arms, although individual countries naturally can not be equally engaged in all processes and fora.

- More attention should be given to exploiting synergies, promoting complementarity, avoiding overlaps and identifying possible gaps not covered by the various initiatives. Increased cooperation and information sharing among law enforcement authorities, criminal intelligence agencies, customs officials, development assistance agencies, as well as authorities responsible for peacekeeping operations, – within and between governments – is a practical step that should be further developed.

- The leading role played by the United Nations in raising awareness and understanding of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons was recognized, as well as its contribution to tackling the problem. The Protocol Against Illicit Firearms Trafficking will be a critical step toward addressing the issue of small arms. The UN Conference on Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001 will be an important contribution to adressing problems related to small arms. It was noted that the success of this conference requires an open and thorough preparatory process with the broadest possible participation. It is also important that the UN Conference in 2001 take into account the outcome of the negotiations of the firearms protocol to be concluded shortly to ensure complementarity and mutually reinforcing outcomes.

- Complete, reliable and up-to-date information and analysis and systematic data collection focused on the problems of small arms is essential for developing coherent policies. The meeting welcomed practical efforts to fill the information gap such as the establishment of a Yearbook on Small Arms and Light Weapons Issues, to be published in Geneva.

- The meeting recognized the importance of exploring possible synergies between the various regional and sub-regional initiatives in order to more effectively implement best practices through more extensive exchanges on experiences and lessons learned.

- Whilst recognizing that governments continue to bear the main responsibility, the meeting emphasized the importance of the contribution made by civil society in general and NGOs active in this field.

Arms Brokering

Participating states shared a deep concern about the flow of small arms and light weapons into areas and countries of conflict and into the hands of transnational organized crime. They recognized the role played therein by arms brokering, which in a broad sense is assistance in the sale and transfer of arms from the producer or holder to the buyer or end-user. The meeting noted that brokers play a significant and largely legal role in facilitating transfers of arms. However, illegal transactions involving small arms or transactions occuring in the grey zone on the fringes of the law contribute to excessive and destabilizing accumulations. Transactions occuring in this grey zone, although not necessarily illegal, can contribute to the detrimental impact of small arms proliferation on states and civilians. Brokers may never see the arms they are conveying and may operate from countries where legislation on brokering activities is missing or insufficient. Differences in the scope of national regulations may serve to create sanctuaries for illicit arms brokers.

The participating states recognized that regulating brokering activities is one element in a comprehensive approach to dealing with problems relating to the flow of small arms and light weapons. In that regard, the meeting discussed various positive developments by states and international organizations in the control of arms brokering. It was recognized that relevant legislative and enforcement measures, combined with international cooperative arrangements, could have a positive impact. The meeting discussed the strengths and weaknesses of various national systems of legislation, regulation and control, which in some cases were seen to be insufficient.

On the basis of these discussions the meeting identified areas for further study, as well as appropriate measures that could be considered for adoption and implementation. These are reflected below.

Measures on arms brokering

International

- Develop common understandings of basic issues and the scope of the problems related to arms brokering.
- Consider the insertion of clauses on brokering activities in legally binding UNSC embargo resolutions.
- Include appropriate provisions on brokering in relevant international legal instruments. In particular, the proposed provision in the Draft Protocol on Firearms would make a significant contribution to a global approach to regulating brokering of arms.
- Develop improved international standards on documentation to reduce fraud.
- Enhance measures between exporting and importing countries to ensure that shipments are not diverted.
- Develop model brokering legislation and regulations, including comprehensive definitions, in order to achieve more effective national control on brokering in all its aspects as well as related activities. These could constitute international standards against which implementation could be measured.

National

- Encourage greater national commitment to implement measures to control brokers and brokering, e.g. by regulation, authorization and/or registration, including prior license requirement.
- Establish national legislation and enforcement systems on small arms brokering where none exist and criminalize violations.
- Offer outreach/training for the adoption of suitable legislation and effective enforcement mechanisms, including industry awareness-building, to countries wishing to improve their systems.

Information exchange

- Exchange information bilaterally, in regional organizations and in other appropriate fora on legislation and enforcement systems concerning brokering and related activities. Such exchanges could i.a. identify loopholes in existing laws and enforcement practices.
- Establish cooperative measures to share information on illicit traders, *cf.* the IAEA information exchange on illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

Appendix I

List of participating States

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Brazil

Canada

Chile

Finland

Germany

Japan

Mali

Mexico

Netherlands

Norway

South Africa

Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

United States of America

Appendix II

Global and regional initiatives

- The Secretary-General's report on small arms of 1999 (report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms) [A/54/258]
- The Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime — the protocol on illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and other related materials
- The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects to be held in June/July 2001
- The OAS Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials and their component parts
- The OAS/CICAD Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition
- The Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa
- Initiatives taken by the Organization of African Unity and the Southern African Development Community on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons
- United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders study of firearms and border control laws and practices
- ASEAN Regional Forum intersessional group on confidence-building measures consideration of the issue of preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms
- South Pacific Chiefs of Police conference work on a common regional approach to weapon control, focusing on the illicit manufacture of, and trafficking in, firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials
- The OSCE Istanbul statement on small arms/the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers
- The OECD/DAC guidelines on peace, conflict and development
- The Brussels Call for Action adopted by the International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development, Brussels, 12 and 13 October 1998
- An International Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding, adopted at the Oslo Meeting on Small Arms, 13 and 14 July 1998
- The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the first European Union annual report on arms exports
- The European Union Programme for Combating and Preventing Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms

- **The European Union joint action on small arms and light weapons**
- **Establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Small Arms and related initiatives**
- **The European Union-United States Joint Statement and Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons, to be released on 15 December 1999**
- **The European Union-Canada Joint Statement and Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons, released on 2 September 1999**
- **Member States of MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) Joint Register of Buyers and Sellers of Firearms, Explosives, Ammunition and Related Materials (1998)**
- **Declaration of the First Conference of Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union, held at Rio de Janeiro in June 1999**

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1608
15 March 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 MARCH 2000 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BELARUS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING AND MINE STOCKPILE ELIMINATION, WHICH WAS HELD IN MINSK ON 6 AND 7 MARCH 2000

I have the honour to transmit to you information about the International Workshop on Humanitarian De-mining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, which was held in Minsk on 6 and 7 March 2000.

I would be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to ensure that the attached information is distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament to all delegations of the member States and observers in the Conference.

(Signed) Syargei Mikhnevich
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

GE.00-60732

On March 6-7, 2000, the International Workshop on Humanitarian De-mining and Mine Stockpile Elimination was held in Minsk, Belarus. Delegates from Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United States of America, International Committee of the Red Cross and the Secretariat of the United Nations participate in workshop. Broad-ranging and result-oriented discussions were aimed at accurately defining the scope of the landmine problem, developing possible solutions and identifying international resources that could be made available to assist the Republic of Belarus in its de-mining and mine stockpile elimination activities.

On the basis of the data, provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, workshop participants received clear evidence that:

• having been a mine-affected country during two world wars, the Republic of Belarus fully shares all mine-related humanitarian concerns of international community;

• the Republic of Belarus supports the goal of prohibiting use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines;

• the Republic of Belarus does not produce anti-personnel mines;

• in 1995 the Republic of Belarus signed a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines which now enjoys a de-facto international recognition; it has been extended by Belarus to the end of 2002;

• the Republic of Belarus still suffers the consequences of World War II; a lot of unexploded ordinances, including anti-personnel mines, still kill and maim civilian population;

• the Republic of Belarus faces a severe problem of eliminating a huge stockpile of anti-personnel landmines left in the country after the break-up of the Soviet Union;

• the Republic of Belarus requests international assistance to conduct further demining and stockpile elimination. Assistance is required to meet the high costs involved and the lack of financial resources and relevant technologies;

• Because of financial problems the Republic of Belarus is not ready at present to join the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction but resolves to consider to join at some time in the future;

• the Republic of Belarus will consider becoming a Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction after de-mining and stockpile elimination activities with international financial and technological assistance has been provided;

• the Republic of Belarus is ready to begin de-mining and stockpile elimination cooperation with any interested party and welcomes any related proposals and initiatives.

The Republic of Belarus appeals to the international community, including governments, international agencies and non-governmental organizations, to assist the Republic of Belarus in its de-mining and stockpile elimination activities. The Republic of Belarus welcomes related technical, technological and financial assistance as well as assistance to victims and in establishing and implementing mine awareness programs.

Workshop participants express an opinion that the framework of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction creates the most favorable circumstances for States Parties to receive financial and technical assistance from international community.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1609
24 March 2000

Original: ENGLISH

NEW ZEALAND

RESOLUTION ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY

THE NEW ZEALAND PARLIAMENT, 23 FEBRUARY 2000

The Parliament of New Zealand resolves, relying upon:

- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- the final document of the first UN special session devoted to disarmament;
- the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987;
- the unanimous finding of the International Court of Justice and its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons that,

  "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control";

- the unanimous report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons;
- the (Eight) Foreign Ministers Joint Declaration 1998;
- and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999;

as a mark of the dawning of the year 2000, to appeal to all fellow member states of the United Nations, and especially the nuclear weapons states, to join with New Zealand in fulfilling the obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control

and that the text of this resolution be conveyed by the Government to each and every member state of the United Nations by the most effective diplomatic means available; and copies of the resolution be simultaneously communicated by the Government to the UN Secretary-General, the President of the UN General Assembly, the President of the UN Security Council, the President of the Conference on Disarmament, and the President of the International Court of Justice; and that the Government of New Zealand work for the fulfilment of the obligation in all appropriate international forums.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1610
29 March 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MONGOLIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE LAW OF MONGOLIA ON "THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS" AND THE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION ON THIS SUBJECT ADOPTED BY THE PARLIAMENT OF MONGOLIA ON 3 FEBRUARY 2000

I have the honour to transmit to you the Law of Mongolia on "the Nuclear-weapon-free status" and the Parliamentary Resolution on this subject adopted by the Parliament of Mongolia on 3 February 2000.

I would be grateful if these Law and Resolution are circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Such-Ochir Bold
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.00-60956

Law of Mongolia

February 3, 2000 City of Ulaanbaatar

ON THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS

CHAPTER ONE

General provisions

Article 1. Purpose of the Law

The purpose of the present Law is to regulate relations pertaining to the preservation of the territory of Mongolia in its entirety, including its air space, land, waters and the sub-soil free from nuclear weapons, which constitutes an important factor for ensuring Mongolia's security.

Article 2. Legislation on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status

2.1 The legislation on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status shall consist of the Constitution of Mongolia, the present Law and other legislative acts adopted in conformity with them.

2.2 In case an international treaty to which Mongolia is a party contains provisions different from those provided for in the present Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail.

Article 3. Definitions

3.1 The definitions contained in the present Law shall have the following meaning:

3.1.1 "nuclear weapon" means any explosive device that is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrollable manner and that can be used for hostile purposes;

3.1.2 "nuclear-weapon-free status" means a legal status of being free from nuclear weapons.

Article 4. Prohibitions resulting from the nuclear-weapon-free status

4.1 An individual, legal person or any foreign State shall be prohibited on the territory of Mongolia from committing, initiating or participating in the following acts or activities relating to nuclear weapons:

4.1.1 develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons;
4.1.2 station or transport nuclear weapons by any means;
4.1.3 test or use nuclear weapons;
4.1.4 dump or dispose nuclear weapons grade radioactive material or nuclear waste.

4.2 Transportation through the territory of Mongolia of nuclear weapons, parts or components thereof, as well as of nuclear waste or any other nuclear material designed or produced for weapons purposes shall be prohibited.

Article 5. Uses of nuclear energy and technology

5.1 The use of nuclear energy and technology shall be permitted only by the State administrative authority in charge of nuclear energy and solely for peaceful purposes such as health care, mining, energy production and scientific research in accordance with the provisions of the international treaties to which Mongolia is a party as well as in conformity with the norms and principles of international law.

5.2 For the purpose of implementing Article 5.1 of the present Law and banning the dumping or storage in the vicinity of the borders of Mongolia of nuclear material or waste that might directly or in the long run indirectly adversely affect the safety of the population and the environment, Mongolia shall cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), other appropriate international organizations and the States that have nuclear programs.

CHAPTER TWO

Verification

Article 6. National verification of the implementation of the legislation on the nuclear-weapon-free status

6.1 On the basis of the proposals of the central administrative authority in charge of foreign relations and of other organizations, the National Security Council of Mongolia shall, within its functions and competence, coordinate the following activities:

6.1.1 implementing of a single State policy concerning the prohibited and permitted activities pertaining to the nuclear-weapon-free status in Mongolia;

6.1.2 institutionalizing internationally Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status;

6.1.3 taking an active part in the activities of the appropriate international organizations, exchanging information on the prohibited and permitted activities in Mongolia and providing information to national organizations.

6.2 The competent authority of Mongolia shall have the right to gather information, stop, detain and search any suspected aircraft, train, vehicle, individual or group of persons.

6.3 The central administrative authority in charge of foreign relations shall be entrusted with monitoring the compliance with the present Law and the international commitments assumed by Mongolia in connection with the nuclear-weapon-free status.

6.4 Non-governmental organizations or individuals may, within the mandate provided for by the legislation, exercise public oversight of the implementation of the legislation on the nuclear-weapon-free status and submit proposals thereon to the relevant State authority.

Article 7. International verification on the implementation of the legislation on the nuclear-weapon-free status

7.1 Mongolia shall conduct international verification over the implementation of the present Law in cooperation with the relevant international organizations or by concluding special international agreements thereon.

CHAPTER THREE

Liability

Article 8. Liability for violation of the legislation on the nuclear-weapon-free status

8.1 An individual or legal person that violates Article 4 of the present Law shall be held liable in accordance with the Criminal Code.

8.2 The facility, equipment, material, raw material or means of transportation used for the activities prohibited by Article 4.1 of the present Law shall be expropriated by the State.

8.3 An individual or legal person that violates the present Law shall pay compensation for the damage caused to the interests of Mongolia as well as to the population, the environment and the properties in accordance with the

relevant legislation of Mongolia or in conformity with the appropriate international treaty, the principles and norms of international law.

8.4 In case of violation or suspected violation of the present Law by a foreign State, Mongolia shall, within its international treaty obligations or norms and principles of international law, officially notify the State concerned of the violation or suspected violation, request explanation and peacefully resolve any question that may arise therefrom. If deemed necessary, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant bodies could be asked for assistance. In case of a dispute of a legal nature, measures could be taken up to referring the matter to the relevant international court or arbitration.

Article 9. Amendment and termination of the Law

9.1 If the vital interests of Mongolia are affected, the present Law may be amended or terminated.

CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE
GREAT HURAL OF MONGOLIA — R. GONCHIGDORJ

Resolution

of the State Great Hural of Mongolia

February 3, 2000 No. 19 City of Ulaanbaatar

On measures to be taken in connection with the adoption of the law on the nuclear-weapon-free status

In its foreign policy, Mongolia sets the goal of pursuing its national interests, developing friendly cooperation with all the countries of the world as well as actively contributing, to the extent possible, to the efforts of the international community to strengthen peace and security. It is also pursuing a policy of refraining from joining any military alliance or grouping, or allowing the use of its territory against any other State as well as banning the stationing on its territory of foreign troops and weapons, including nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. With respect to its two neighboring States, Mongolia is pursuing the policy of maintaining balanced and friendly relations and developing broad cooperation.

Mongolia consistently advocates disarmament and, on its part, is taking concrete steps to promote the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Within the framework of this policy, in 1992 Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has since been pursuing the policy of and taking the measures aimed at institutionalizing and guaranteeing it. One of the results of such a policy has been the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly at its 53rd regular session on 4 December, 1998 of the resolution 53/77D entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status".

Keeping Mongolia's territory free of nuclear weapons is fully in line with its policy aimed at strengthening its national security by political and diplomatic means.

Strengthening Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status at the State policy level, further clearer defining of the status and its observance would be important in strengthening mutual confidence and Mongolia's external security environment as well as in linking the country's national security to regional security and stability.

Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status represents a novel approach in the practice of international relations, which in its wider context could be considered as our country's concrete contribution to the policy and efforts of the international community aimed at strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Based on the all above and in connection with the adoption of the Law of Mongolia on nuclear-weapon-free status, the State Great Hural of Mongolia resolves:

1. To mandate the Government /R. Amarjargal/ to take the following measures:

1/ to actively cooperate with and acquire assistance from the relevant States, international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, in implementing the Law of Mongolia on the nuclear-weapon-free status and the United Nations General Assembly resolution entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status";

2/ to take the necessary measures to ensure normal functioning of the stations designed to monitor nuclear weapons tests, that are situated on the territory of Mongolia;

3/ to report, as the case may be, to the Standing Committee on Security and Foreign Policy Affairs of the State Great Hural of Mongolia on the implementation of the Law of Mongolia on the nuclear-weapon-free status, of the present Resolution and other legislative acts adopted in conformity with them.

2. The present Resolution shall be implemented from the day of the entry into force of the Law of Mongolia on the nuclear-weapon-free status.

CHAIRMAN R. GONCHIGDORJ

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1611
25 April 2000

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 20 APRIL 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE ON 14 APRIL 2000 BY MR. VLADIMIR V. PUTIN, ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, IN CONNECTION WITH THE RATIFICATION BY THE STATE DUMA OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION OF THE START-II TREATY AND OF THE PACKAGE OF 1997 AGREEMENTS ON ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement issued on 14 April 2000 by the acting President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir V. Putin, in connection with the adoption by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of laws on the ratification of the START-II Treaty and of the package of 1997 agreements on anti-missile defence.

I should be grateful if the statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States of the Conference participating in its work.

(Signed): Vasily Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of the delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.00-61084 (E)

STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ADOPTION BY THE STATE DUMA OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION OF LAWS ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE START-II TREATY AND OF THE PACKAGE OF 1997 AGREEMENTS ON ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE

The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation has just adopted a decision on the ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, more commonly known as the START-II Treaty, and the package of 1997 agreements on anti-missile defence. This is a wise and important decision. It is important in terms both of the national interests of our State and of the interests of international peace and security as a whole.

For the Russian Federation, the conclusion of the START-II Treaty provides it with the opportunity to guarantee its security on the basis of parity with the United States of America - at a level of strategic offensive arms lower than before, half the level of the START-I Treaty currently in force and, of course, at less expense.

The ratification of the START-II Treaty opens the path to the launching of official talks on further reductions of Russian and United States strategic arsenals within the framework of a START-III Treaty. We are prepared to reduce our strategic offensive arms - naturally, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States - to a level lower than that provided for in the 1997 Russian-American agreement in Helsinki, i.e. to 1,500 warheads, instead of 2,000-2,500.

The decision of the State Duma is a good and positive signal to the international community. As a great nuclear Power, the Russian Federation is demonstrating its sense of responsibility, as it makes steady progress in the direction of arms reduction and disarmament. We are setting an example of practical fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, thereby strengthening the regime established by that Treaty.

There is another vitally important aspect of the decision adopted by the State Duma.

In recent time, the world has been giving a great deal of attention to the problem of the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies and there has been talk of a growing so-called "missile threat" and of the need to take urgent measures to counter that threat. One such measure, put forward by the United States, is the creation of a national anti-ballistic missile defence system, which is in conflict with the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty).

We advocate the adoption, together with other States, of measures to counteract the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. In our view, however, this should not be done by dismantling existing agreements in the area of disarmament - particularly the ABM Treaty. We favour a different route: the strengthening of existing non-proliferation regimes and the elaboration of new arms reduction treaties. The Russian Federation's ratification of the START-II Treaty represents a real contribution to those efforts.

We are counting on the United States to make the same constructive choice. The United States has yet to conclude the ratification procedures that will bring START-II into force and to approve the package of agreements on ABM issues, which strengthen the 1972 Treaty. The success of the disarmament process and the formation of a new political climate in the world depend, first and foremost, on the actions taken by our two countries.

(Signed): Vladimir V. Putin
Acting President of the
Russian Federation

Moscow, 14 April 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1612
26 April 2000

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 25 APRIL 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE ON 21 APRIL 2000 BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CONNECTION WITH THE RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY BY THE STATE DUMA OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 21 April 2000 in connection with the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

I should be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Vasily Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of the delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY BY THE STATE DUMA OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

On 21 April 2000, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted, by an overwhelming majority, a Federal Act on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Ratification by the State Duma of CTBT is yet another confirmation of the steady progress made by our country towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, disarmament and strategic stability in the world.

The community of nations has come a long way to reach the comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The journey from the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to CTBT has taken nearly 40 years.

Alongside the recent endorsement of the START-II Treaty by both houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, our country, as a great nuclear Power, by ratifying CTBT is demonstrating its sense of responsibility before the international community and its commitment to fulfilment of its obligations in the area of strengthening strategic stability, arms reduction and disarmament, including in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As the NPT Review Conference draws near, particular stress must be laid on the role of CTBT as a vital factor in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We are convinced that both the national interests of the Russian Federation and, to an equal extent, those of humankind as a whole are served by the earliest possible entry into force of CTBT and by making the Treaty universal in its extent. A comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and the signing up of all States with a nuclear-weapon potential to this ban would pose an insurmountable obstacle to any attempts aiming at the proliferation and qualitative improvement of these weapons.

Once again we call on all countries which have yet to sign or to ratify CTBT to do so as soon as possible, so that the goals proclaimed in the Treaty can be realized in the immediate future.

Moscow, 21 April 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1613
23 May 2000

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 22 MAY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE ON 18 MAY 2000 BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE PROCESS OF RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY BY THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 18 May 2000 in connection with the completion of the process of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

I should be grateful if this statement could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Vassily Sidorov
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of the delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE PROCESS OF RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY BY THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

On 17 May 2000, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation approved the Federal Act on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). With that the process of ratification of this highly significant instrument by the legislative branch of power in Russia was concluded.

Support by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for ratification of CTBT provides further evidence of the fundamental commitment of our country to the strengthening of international security, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament.

The response all over the world to the steps we have taken demonstrates that the ratification of CTBT by the Russian Federation as a nuclear Power is viewed as a clear signal from the new Russian leadership in favour of greater strategic stability and trust between peoples. By ratifying CTBT, the Russian Federation has once again convincingly demonstrated that it is true to its word and committed to honouring its obligations in the area of arms control and disarmament.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation reaffirms the need to preserve earlier arms control agreements which form the basis for strategic stability in the world and to prevent the collapse of those agreements. In this connection, we express our firm belief that the earliest possible entry into force of CTBT, which poses an effective obstacle to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to their proliferation, is in the interests of all humankind. The potential of CTBT can only be effectively realized if it is ratified by all nuclear-weapon States and by other countries whose ratification is essential for its entry into force in accordance with the provisions of article XIV of the Treaty. We therefore call on those countries which have not yet signed or ratified CTBT to do so as soon as possible, to facilitate the practical realization of the goals enshrined in the Treaty and in the interests of ensuring security and peace.

18 May 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1614
25 May 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MAY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING, ON BEHALF OF BRAZIL, EGYPT, IRELAND, MEXICO, NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA AND SWEDEN, A PORTION OF THE TEXT ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS BY THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REGARDING PRACTICAL STEPS FOR THE SYSTEMATIC AND PROGRESSIVE EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY

On behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden I have the honour to inform you that the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted by consensus, in its Final Document, practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty.

These steps read as follows:

"15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

   - Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

   - Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear-weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary-confidence building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

   - The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

   - Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

   - A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

   - The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world."

We request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Antonio de Icaza
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1615
25 May 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 MAY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF PAKISTAN ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), HELD IN NEW YORK FROM 24 APRIL TO 20 MAY 2000

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan has issued a statement on the outcome of the Sixth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), held in New York from 24 April to 20 May 2000.

I shall be grateful if this statement of the Foreign Minister is circulated as an official document of the Conference.

(Signed): Munir Akram
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.00-61550

Foreign Minister's Statement on the Sixth Review Conference of the NPT, held in New York from 24 April to 20 May 2000

The Sixth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), ended in New York on the 20th of May. While Pakistan had attended all the previous Review Conferences of the Treaty as an observer, this time we decided not to attend, because of the changed nuclear realities in South Asia. Nevertheless, Pakistan has followed the deliberations of the Conference closely, and has taken note of the Final Document of the Conference, in particular the commitment in principle by the NPT nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Pakistan will be prepared to participate in efforts to achieve that global objective on a non-discriminatory basis.

The NPT Review Conference's call for the observance of the CTBT even before its entry into force is a positive contribution to the strengthening of the no-test norm. Having voted for the CTBT in 1996 and declared a unilateral moratorium on further tests in 1998, Pakistan will maintain its policy of responsibility and restraint.

We cannot accept the position taken by the Review Conference on the nuclear tests conducted by India and then Pakistan in May 1998. It is important to recall that for over two decades, since the first Indian test in 1974, Pakistan vigorously pursued the goal of keeping South Asia free of nuclear weapons. We did not initiate the induction of weapons capability into the region. Nor was Pakistan the first to conduct nuclear explosive tests. While India's nuclear tests destabilised the security environment in South Asia, Pakistan's tests restored the strategic balance. Therefore, the distinction between the nuclear ambitions of India and the compulsions of Pakistan must be acknowledged and preserved.

Pakistan's nuclear deterrent now forms an indispensable part of its defence doctrine. Our nuclear capability is solely for the purpose of deterring aggression against Pakistan. We remain sensitive to the international non-proliferation concerns. We are opposed to an arms race or introduction of weapons systems which could destabilise the security environment of the region. Pakistan also abides fully by its commitment not to transfer sensitive materials, equipment and technologies.

In sharp contrast to Pakistan's nuclear policy of restraint and responsibility, India is embarked on an ambitious programme for deployment of large-scale nuclear forces on land, air and sea. This was evident from India's draft nuclear doctrine unveiled in August last year. India is similarly engaged in a massive conventional arms build-up.

Pakistan continues to hope that the NPT nuclear-weapon States and the international community will support Pakistan's proposals for a Strategic Restraint Regime, involving nuclear and conventional restraints, and resolution of the long-standing issue of Jammu and Kashmir, which has been recognised by the UN Security Council in its resolution 1172 as the root cause of tensions in the region. India must adopt the course of dialogue to address this grave issue to ensure durable peace and security in South Asia.

Islamabad
23 May 2000

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1616
16 June 2000

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JUNE 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF RELEVANT EXTRACTS ON DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE XIIITH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HELD ON 8/9 APRIL 2000 IN CARTAGENA, COLOMBIA

South Africa, in its capacity as current Chair of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, is honoured to transmit herewith relevant extracts on disarmament and international security issues from the Final Document of the recent XIIIth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cartagena, Colombia.

I kindly request that these extracts be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and circulated to the delegations of all members States of the Conference and non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed) : George Nene
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

GE.00-61839

EXTRACTS ON DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES FROM THE XIIITH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HELD ON 8/9 APRIL 2000 IN CARTEGENA, COLOMBIA

QUOTE

CHAPTER I GLOBAL ISSUES

The International context since the Durban Summit

5. We emphasize that even when the spectre of a nuclear holocaust seems more remote than in the recent past and several countries resolved to reduce their military budgets in order to devote such resources to meet the social and economic development requirements of their people, great powers continue to endanger the future of humankind through the unjustified stockpiling and development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and a rampant traffic in armaments continues to put in jeopardy the security and stability of vast regions of the world.

Disarmament and International Security

67. We reaffirm and reiterate the long-standing principled positions of the Movement on disarmament and international security, including the decisions taken at the XII Summit in Durban.

68. We are deeply concerned at the updating of strategic defense doctrines that set out new rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard also, we are deeply concerned over the new "Alliance Strategic Concept" adopted by NATO in April 1999, which not only maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence, but also includes new elements aimed to open even more the scope for possible use or threat of use of force by NATO.

69. We are furthermore concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space, which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. In this connection, we call upon the States Parties to the ABM Treaty to fully comply with its provisions.

70. We are convinced of the need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles, in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, as a contribution to international peace and security. In this context, we recall General Assembly resolution 54/54 F.

71. We reiterate our long standing principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing. We stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), including by all the Nuclear Weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. We express our satisfaction that 155 States have signed the Treaty and 55 States have ratified it thus far. We reiterate that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realised, the continued commitment of all State signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. We express our concern over the recent negative developments with regard to the ratification of the CTBT.

72. We reaffirm the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. In this context, we regret that the continued inflexible postures of the Nuclear Weapon States continues to prevent the Conference on Disarmament from establishing in 2000 an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call on the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

73. We reiterate our conviction that efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority by the members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

74. We consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The Movement welcomes the efforts aimed at creation of new nuclear-weapons-free zones in all regions of the world and calls for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the states of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I). In this context, we welcome the adoption by the United

Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 session of a document entitled "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned." We also welcome and support the recent adoption by the Mongolian Parliament of legislation on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status as a concrete contribution to the international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

75. We reiterate the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. To this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment, we call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We express great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States and we condemn Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. We are of the view that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons which allow one party to threaten its neighbours and the region. We further welcome the initiative by H.E. Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, on the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We stress that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for the establishment of this zone. We also call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, we express our serious concern over the recent development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one Nuclear Weapon State. This development will have potentially serious negative implications on the regional security as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

76. We, the Ministers of the States Parties to the NPT, reiterate our call and the firm commitment by all States parties to the Treaty for the full implementation at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, of the package agreed to at the 1995 NPT Review

and Extension Conference which comprises of the decision on "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty", the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", the decision on "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", and the "Resolution on the Middle East". We note with appreciation that specific time as made available at the Third Preparatory session for the 2000 Review Conference for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4 (C) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of the implementation of the call by our Heads of State or Government for the Review Conference to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT.

77. We note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist. We emphasize that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. In this regard we also express our strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA's Statute.

78. We, the Ministers of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) welcome the increasing number of ratifications of the Convention and invite all States who have still not ratified it do so as soon as possible with the view to its universality. We also underline the urgency of satisfactorily resolving the unresolved issues in the framework of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with a view to paving the ground for the effective, full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Convention. In this context, we reiterate our call on the developed countries to promote international cooperation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention. We emphasize the need for

an urgent conclusion of the relationship agreement between the United Nations and the OPCW, in accordance with the provisions of the CWC.

79. While asserting that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) inherently precludes the use of biological weapons, we, the Ministers of the States Parties to the Convention recall the decision by the BWC Review Conference that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention. We reiterate our conviction that the use of biological weapons, in any way and under any circumstances, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention and we express the wish for this issue to be pursued further by the State Parties. We note the progress achieved so far in negotiating a Protocol to strengthen the BWC and reaffirm the decision of the Fourth Review Conference urging the conclusion of the negotiations by the Ad Hoc Group as soon as possible, before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference, and for it to submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus, to the States Parties to consider it at a Special Conference. Therefore artificial deadlines should be avoided. While we also note that there still exist a number of outstanding issues that need to be resolved, we are satisfied with the substantial progress which has been achieved in the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group, and wish to emphasize that the principle of negotiation on the rolling text provides the methodology for resolving outstanding issues by consensus. Finally, and in this context, we call for flexibility to be shown on the outstanding issues as has already been demonstrated by the positive contributions on key issues made by the NAM and Other States participating in the negotiations, and we call on the Ad Hoc Group to conclude its work at the earliest possible date allowing sufficient time for the steps which would need to be taken for the consideration of the outcome of the Ad Hoc Group's work at a special conference to be held prior to the BWC's 2001 Review Conference.

80. We remain deeply concerned over the illicit transfer, manufacture and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation and proliferation in many countries, with destabilizing effects. We fully share the regional and international concern that the easy availability of illicit small arms and light weapons escalate conflicts, undermine political stability and have a devastating impact on peace and security. We invite the international community, in cooperation with international and other regional organizations to work together towards resolving the problem of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. In this context, we welcome the decision adopted by the 35th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation

of African Unity (OAU) held in Algiers, Algeria, regarding the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons; the entry into force on July 1, 1998, of the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials; the decision on prevention and combatting of illicit trafficking in small arms and related crimes adopted by the Council of Ministers at the 19th Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Southern African Development Community held in Maputo, Mozambique; the initiative taken by the States members of the Economic Community of West African States in declaring a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa; the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa adopted at the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa Conference on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 12 - 15 March 2000 and we encourage similar initiatives in this regard.

81. We express our support for the convening of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects which will be held in 2001, and welcome the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference which held its first meeting from 28 February -3 March 2000. We recall that the General Assembly at its 54th session, in resolution 54/54 V, decided that the scope of the UN Conference will be the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. We reiterate our call for the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee to utilize the inter-sessional period to conduct open-ended informal consultations in a transparent manner to facilitate the widest possible exchange of views on all issues related to this Conference. we are also in favour of informal intersessional meetings prior to the second session on all issues pertaining to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects provided that such meetings should be held in New York in order to ensure the widest possible participation of States, in particular countries with limited representation, and to ensure continuity in the work of the Preparatory Committee. We invite the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee to submit a report to the Preparatory Committee at its second session on the outcome of consultations conducted in the inter-sessional period. We stress that the venues of future Preparatory Committee session and the Conference should ensure the broadest participation of all Member States of the United Nations, in particular countries with limited representation. In this regard, we take note with appreciation, of the offer made by the Republic of Kenya to host one of the future Preparatory Committee Sessions. We believe that the Conference should

be chaired by a representative of a country affected by the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons.

82. We deplore the use, in contravention of international humanitarian law, of anti-personnel mines in conflict situations aimed at maiming, killing and terrorizing innocent civilians, denying them access to farmland, causing famine and forcing them to flee their homes eventually leading to depopulation and preventing the return of civilians to their place of original residence. We call upon the international community to provide the necessary assistance to landmine clearance operations as well as the rehabilitation of victims and their social and economic reintegration in the landmine affected countries. We further call for international assistance to ensure full access of affected countries to material equipment, technology and financial resources for mine clearance. We also call for increased humanitarian assistance for victims of landmines.

83. We express concern about the residue of the Second World War, particularly in the form of landmines which have caused human and material damage and obstructed development plans in some Non-Aligned countries. We call on the States responsible for laying the mines outside their territories to cooperate with the affected countries, provide the necessary information, and maps indicating the locations of such mines, technical assistance for their clearance and contribute towards defrayal of the costs of clearance and provide compensation for any ensuing losses.

84. We call on States to become parties to the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and its Protocols, in particular in light of the Review Conference in 2001. We take note of the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to the CCw, realized in Geneva in December 1999 and stress the importance of its effective implementation. We also take note of the realization of the First Meeting of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction which took place in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999.

85. We call for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.

86. We reiterate once again our support for the convening of the

Fourth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. We express deep concern over the lack of consensus on the deliberations held by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999 on the agenda and objectives. We note that the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States and report to the 55th General Assembly on the objectives, agenda and timing of the Special Session. In this regard, we direct the Coordinating Bureau to entrust the NAM Working Group on Disarmament with the task of continuing to press for further steps leading to the convening of the Fourth Special Session with the participation of all Member States of the United Nations as well as the need for SSOD-IV to review and assess the implementation of SSOD-I, while reaffirming its principles and priorities.

Indian Ocean

87. We reaffirm the validity of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. We reaffirm the importance of international cooperation to ensure peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region. We note that greater efforts and more time are required to facilitate a focused discussion on practical measures to ensure conditions of peace, security and stability in the region. We also note that in light of resolution 54/47 of the United Nations General Assembly, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean will continue his informal consultations on the future work of the Committee.

UNQUOTE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1617
21 June 2000

Original: ENGLISH and
RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 19 JUNE 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXTS OF THREE DOCUMENTS ISSUED AT THE RECENT MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN MOSCOW

Attached are the Russian and English language texts of three documents issued at the recent meeting of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in Moscow:

1. Joint Statement Concerning Management and Disposition of Weapon-Grade Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation;

2. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data From Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches; and

3. Joint Statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Principles of Strategic Stability.

We would be grateful if you would issue these texts as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all Member States and non-member participants of the CD.

(Signed): Vasily S. SIDOROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Head of Delegation of the
Russian Federation to the
Conference on Disarmament

(Signed): Robert T. GREY, Jr.
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the
Conference on Disarmament

Joint Statement Concerning Management and Disposition of Weapon-Grade Plutonium Designated As No Longer Required for Defense Purposes And Related Cooperation

The Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States announced today completion of the bilateral Agreement for the management and disposition of weapon-grade plutonium withdrawn from their respective nuclear weapon programs and declared excess to defense purposes. This Agreement will ensure that this plutonium will be changed into forms unusable for nuclear weapons by consumption as fuel in nuclear reactors or by immobilization rendering it suitable for geologic disposal.

Based on the 1998 Summit Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium, this Agreement charts the course and sets the conditions for such activities. It reconfirms our determination to take steps necessary to ensure that it is never again used for nuclear weapons or any other military purpose and is managed and disposed in a way that is safe, secure, ecologically sound, transparent and irreversible. It reaffirms our commitment to nuclear disarmament.

This Agreement will ensure that the management and disposition activities are monitored and, thus, transparent for the international community. It provides for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification once appropriate agreements with the IAEA are concluded.

This Agreement builds on the approaches to such plutonium management and disposition agreed at the 1996 G-8 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit. We reaffirm our intentions to continue to work closely with other countries, in particular other G-8 leaders, who have provided strong support over past years for initiation and implementation of these programs. In this regard, we hope that significant progress will be made as well at the G-8 Summit this July in Okinawa.

This Agreement will enable new cooperation to go forward between the Russian Federation and the United States. We note that the United States Congress has appropriated 200 million USD for this cooperation and the U.S. Administration intends to seek additional appropriations.

This Agreement will soon be signed by Prime Minister Kasyanov and Vice President Gore.

Moscow
June 4, 2000

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CENTER FOR THE EXCHANGE OF DATA FROM EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND NOTIFICATIONS OF MISSILE LAUNCHES

The Russian Federation and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Guided by the Joint Statement of the Presidents of Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning of September 2, 1998,

Taking into account the need to minimize the consequences of a false missile attack warning and to prevent the possibility of a missile launch caused by such false warning,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. In order to set up an uninterrupted exchange of information on launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles from the early warning systems of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, hereinafter, the warning systems of the Parties, as well as to provide for the possible implementation of a multilateral regime for the exchange of notifications of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles, the Parties shall establish, in Moscow, a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems and notifications of missile launches, hereinafter, the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC).

2. Each Party shall appoint its representative and deputy representatives, hereinafter, respectively, the JDEC Heads and Deputy Heads, who shall have equal rights in managing the activities of the JDEC.

3. The JDEC Heads shall jointly carry out the daily management of JDEC activities, and shall be jointly responsible for the performance of the tasks assigned to the JDEC.

4. Operations of the JDEC shall be jointly carried out by specially trained operational personnel of the Parties.

Article 2

The JDEC shall provide for the:

a. implementation of an exchange of information on launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles detected by the warning systems of the Parties;

b. efficient resolution of possible ambiguous situations related to information from the warning systems of the Parties;

c. creation of the conditions for the preparation and maintenance of a unified database for a multilateral regime for the exchange of notifications of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

Article 3

1. Information shall be exchanged on the following types of objects detected by the warning systems of the Parties in accordance with Appendices 1 and 2 to this Memorandum, which define the types of objects on which information shall be exchanged and the implementation phases of the information exchange:

a. all launches of ICBMs and SLBMs of the Russian Federation and the United States of America;

b. launches of ballistic missiles, that are not ICBMs or SLBMs, of the Russian Federation and the United States of America;

c. launches of ballistic missiles of third states that could pose a direct threat to the Parties or that could create an ambiguous situation and lead to possible misinterpretation;

d. launches of space launch vehicles.

2. Each Party, at its discretion, in support of the objectives of this Memorandum or Article 3 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of September 30, 1971, may also provide information on other launches and objects, including de-orbiting spacecraft, and geophysical experiments and other work in near-earth space that are capable of disrupting the normal operation of equipment of the warning systems of the Parties.

Article 4

1. The sources for obtaining information exchanged pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Memorandum shall be the equipment of the space- and ground-based warning systems of the Parties. When exchanging information, the sources of the data shall not be specified.

2. Each Party shall provide processed launch information in a time frame that is near real time, if possible.

Article 5

Whenever available, the following information shall be exchanged in accordance with the formats set forth in Appendix 3 to this Memorandum:

a. when a launch of a ballistic missile is detected - the time of launch, generic missile class, geographic area of the launch, geographic area of payload impact, estimated time of payload impact and launch azimuth;

b. when a launch of a space launch vehicle is detected - the time of launch, generic missile class, geographic area of the launch and launch azimuth.

Article 6

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for purposes of overseeing the activities of the JDEC and coordinating the implementation of this Memorandum. The regulations of the Joint Commission are set forth in Appendix 4 to this Memorandum.

Article 7

The Parties shall jointly provide for the:

a. drafting, agreement and updating of documents establishing JDEC operating procedures, including implementation of JDEC joint duty shifts;

b. training of personnel for the performance of the tasks assigned to the JDEC at locations agreed by the Parties;

c. designation of primary and backup communications channels to ensure uninterrupted JDEC operations;

d. confidentiality of the information exchanged between the JDEC and the warning systems of the Parties.

Article 8

1. The Parties intend that the JDEC shall commence operations 365 days after this Memorandum enters into force.

2. Upon commencement of operations, an operational test period lasting up to 100 days shall precede commencement of Phase I of JDEC operations. During this period, the Parties shall test data exchange procedures, equipment and software and shall correct shortcomings that they find. The operational test period shall conclude and Phase I of JDEC operations shall commence upon agreement of the Joint Commission. Acknowledging that the decision of the Joint Commission to transition to subsequent phases is the determining factor, the Parties intend to implement the transition to subsequent phases as soon as practicable.

3. The Executive Agents of the Parties for implementing this Memorandum shall be the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Department of Defense of the United States of America.

4. The JDEC shall consist of the facilities, equipment and individual components listed in Appendix 5 to this Memorandum.

5. The staff and categories of personnel servicing the JDEC are set forth in Appendix 6 to this Memorandum.

6. The working languages of the JDEC shall be Russian and English.

Article 9

1. Funding for establishing the JDEC and funding for its operation shall be shared equally by the Parties.

2. Determination of the application of customs duties and fees, payments, taxes and other charges to the establishment and operation of the JDEC shall be agreed by the Parties once the JDEC architecture has been defined, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article and taking into account the provisions of the laws of the Parties.

Article 10

Each Party shall provide its own transportation to and from the JDEC for its personnel listed in Appendix 6 to this Memorandum.

Article 11

Each Party shall provide its own medical services, including medical insurance, for its personnel working at the JDEC listed in Appendix 6 to this Memorandum.

Article 12

1. Each Party shall provide for the delivery of equipment to outfit the JDEC. The list of this equipment and procedures for its assembly, installation and adjustment shall be agreed by the Parties. The assembly, installation and adjustment of this equipment shall be supervised by the JDEC Heads. Maintenance of JDEC equipment shall be performed by specially trained personnel of the Parties under the supervision of and in accordance with the decisions of the JDEC Heads.

2. JDEC communications shall be organized in accordance with procedures agreed by the Parties.

3. The certification of hardware and software installed in the JDEC shall be carried out as agreed by the Parties, taking into account the laws of the Russian Federation and the technical standards of the United States of America.

4. Each Party shall retain ownership of any equipment, software or other materials that it provides for use in the JDEC.

5. Each Party shall not transfer any equipment, software or other materials, hereinafter, materials, received from the other Party pursuant to this Memorandum to any third state or legal or natural person without the written agreement of the Party that provided these materials. Each Party shall use materials received from the other Party only for the purposes of this Memorandum and shall take all reasonable measures within its power to ensure the safekeeping and security of such materials.

Article 13

1. Information provided by either Party pursuant to this Memorandum shall be considered to be of a confidential and sensitive nature. This information may not be disclosed or transmitted in any form to a third state or any legal or natural person without the written agreement of the Party that provided the information. This information shall be used only for the purposes of this Memorandum.

2. Each Party shall itself determine the necessary measures for the appropriate handling of the information and its required protection in accordance with its own laws and regulations. Each Party shall ensure the required protection for information exchanged between the JDEC and that Party.

3. The Parties shall agree in the Joint Commission on procedures for handling and exchanging information within the JDEC that ensures the information's required protection.

4. In accordance with paragraph 13 of Appendix 4 to this Memorandum, issues relating to compliance with the provisions of this Article shall be considered by the Parties in the Joint Commission.

Article 14

1. Each Party shall facilitate the entry into and exit from its territory by military and civilian personnel of the other Party engaged in implementing this Memorandum.

2. Upon request from the United States of America, the Russian Federation shall issue the necessary documents required for customs formalities and entry into and exit from the Russian Federation by citizens of the United States of America working at the JDEC and for members of their families. Citizens of the United States of America being sent to work at the JDEC shall be subject to the visa requirements of the Russian Federation.

3. Any issues relating to the provisions of this Article shall be resolved through diplomatic channels. The relevant documents shall be requested ahead of time; as a rule, at least 20 days in advance.

Article 15

The Parties shall work out in the Joint Commission agreements on liability for damages that may arise as the result of activities with respect to the implementation of this Memorandum. Except for pre-construction design work, construction work at the JDEC shall not begin before entry into force of these agreements.

Article 16

Neither Party shall display its state symbols on the exterior of the walled perimeter of the JDEC. All signage on the exterior of this perimeter shall be in Russian. All signage within this perimeter shall be in Russian and English.

Article 17

Amendments to this Memorandum shall enter into force upon agreement by the Parties in the Joint Commission.

Article 18

This Memorandum, including its associated appendices, shall not infringe upon the rights and obligations of the Parties under other treaties or agreements.

Article 19

1. This Memorandum, including its associated appendices, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for ten years.

2. Upon agreement by the Parties, this Memorandum may be extended for successive five-year periods.

3. Either Party, upon six months written notice to the other Party, may terminate this Memorandum.

DONE at Moscow on June 4, 2000, in two copies, each in the Russian and the English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: **FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:**

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC STABILITY

1. The Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America agree on the need to maintain strategic nuclear stability. Agreements between them help accomplish this objective.

2. They are dedicated to the cause of strengthening strategic stability and international security. They agree that capability for deterrence has been and remains a key aspect of stability and predictability in the international security environment.

3. The Presidents, welcoming the ratification of START-II Treaty and related documents by the Russian Federation, look forward to the completion of the ratification process in the United States.

4. They announce that discussions will intensify on further reductions in the strategic forces of Russia and the United States within the framework of a future START-III Treaty, and on ABM issues, in accordance with the Moscow Statement of 1998 and Cologne Statement of 1999 by the Presidents.

5. They agree on the essential contribution of the ABM Treaty to reductions in offensive forces, and reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.

6. They agree that the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies, and stress their desire to reverse that process, including through existing and possible new international legal mechanisms. They agree that this new threat represents a potentially significant change in the strategic situation and international security environment.

7. They agree that this emerging threat to security should be addressed and resolved through mutual cooperation and mutual respect of each other's security interests.

8. They recall the existing provision of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty, and, as appropriate, to consider possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty.

9. The Presidents reaffirm their commitment to continuing efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future, taking into account any changes in the international security environment.

10. In reinforcing the effectiveness of the ABM Treaty under present and prospective conditions the Russian Federation and the United States of America attach great importance to enhancing the viability of the Treaty through measures to promote greater cooperation, openness, and trust between the sides.

11. The Russian Federation and the United States of America note the importance of the consultative process and reaffirm their determination to continue consultations in the future to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

12. The key provisions recorded in our agreements and statements, including at the highest level, create a basis for both countries' activities regarding strategic arms under present-day conditions.

13. Such an approach creates confidence that the further strengthening of strategic stability and further reductions in nuclear forces will be based on a foundation that has been tested over decades and advances both countries' interests and security.

14. The Presidents have directed the development of concrete measures that would allow both sides to take necessary steps to preserve strategic stability in the face of new threats, and called on their Ministers and experts to prepare a report for review by the Presidents.

15. They agree that issues of strategic offensive arms cannot be considered in isolation from issues of strategic defensive arms and vice versa -- an interrelationship that is reflected in the ABM Treaty and aims to ensure equally the security of the two countries.

16. The Russian Federation and the United States of America intend to base their activities in the area of strategic offensive and defensive arms on the principles set forth in this document.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Moscow
June 4, 2000